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I. INTRODUCTION: DOWN A FOXHOLE
The recent economic downturn has caused Foxwoods Resort Casino, one
of the largest casinos in the world, to seek a restructuring of nearly $1.5 billion
in debt.1  Ordinarily, bankruptcy proceedings are triggered when a typical com-
mercial enterprise defaults on its debt.  Under these proceedings, creditors step
in and collect monies owed to them before any residual equity is dispersed
amongst owners.  The rub here is that Foxwoods is owned and operated by the
Mashantucket Western Pequot Tribal Nation, a sovereign nation under U.S.
federal law.2  This triggers questions of paramountcy; namely, whether tribunal
sovereignty can trump federal bankruptcy law.
These concerns are hardly limited to the academic environment.  The prac-
tical consequence of dealing with the bankruptcy of a sovereign nation is that
creditors (specifically, unsecured bondholders) may see their claims subordi-
nated to the ownership claims of Foxwoods’ equity holders (i.e., tribal mem-
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1 Scott Van Voorhis, Foxwoods Debt Mess and the Bay State Gambling Debate, BANKER &
TRADESMAN (Sept. 2, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://www.bankerandtradesman.com/blogs/deals
developments/2009/09/02/foxwoods-debt-mess-and-the-bay-state-gambling-debate.
2 Standard and Poor’s lowered the Mashantucket Western Pequot Tribe to a rating of “D”
(the lowest credit rating) to reflect the default on those payments. See Mashantucket West-
ern Peqout Tribe, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS, http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/
ratings/entity-ratings/en/us/?entityID=272381&sectorCode=CORP (last visited Feb. 6,
2011).  On January 20, 2010, a forbearance agreement meant to expire that day was extended
by senior lenders to April 30, 2010 as a temporary measure allowing more time for the Tribe
to restructure its debt. See DEALBOOK, Foxwoods Owner Reaches New Debt Forbearance
Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2010, 6:08 PM) http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/
foxwoods-owner-reaches-new-debt-forbearance-pact.
25
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bers).  This would have significant implications for investors, creditors, the
native gaming industry and the Mashantucket Tribe itself.  Although these par-
ties are currently in the process of negotiation and may very well reach an
agreeable solution without litigation, important legal and policy questions arise
from this situation.
In this article, we argue that where a tribal corporate entity voluntarily
enters into a business contract with non-tribal investors, it must be made sub-
ject both to U.S. bankruptcy law and creditors’ rights, as well as to the terms of
the agreements it undertakes.  Being a commercial participant entails being
commercially responsible.  It means paying liabilities where and as they
become due, in accordance with law and the principles of equity.  Three argu-
ments are made in support of this.3
First, we draw a distinction between a tribe itself acting in a sovereign
capacity and a tribal entity acting in a commercial capacity.  The issue giving
rise to this suit concerns the latter scenario.  The loan agreement is between
Foxwoods, a tribal casino acting in a commercial capacity, and its creditors, the
non-tribal investing public.  Second, the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”)4  is a
statute of general applicability, sufficient to constitute congressional abrogation
of governmental unit immunity.  Third, there are sound policy reasons for abro-
gating Foxwoods’ immunity as a corporate-commercial entity.
II. TRIBAL NATION RECOGNITION
The common law concept of tribal sovereign immunity is several centuries
old and has gone through stages of narrow and broad construction.5  Upon
European colonial contact with Indian settlements, natural law and European
legal theory deemed that the settlements were to be regarded as “nations.”6  Via
national recognition, Europeans could enter into treaties—by their nature lim-
ited to sovereigns—and acquire land.7  King George III’s Royal Proclamation
of 1763 reinforced the idea of tribes being sovereign entities and saw them as
3 We have assumed that the contractual agreement between Foxwoods and its creditors is
sufficiently “standard” (i.e., creditors are to be repaid interest plus principal at maturity,
creditors have distribution priority over equity holders on insolvency, etc.), as we are not
privy to that arrangement (for obvious reasons).
4 See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010) amended by the Bankruptcy Technical Cor-
rections Act of 2010, H.R. 6198, 111th Cong., § 2(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat.
3557, 3557 (2010)).
5 See generally Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimal-
ism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001).
6 R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent
Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes
under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 183 (2002-
2003) (citing Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lehmi Indians, Federal Recog-
nition, and the Creation of Tribal Identity, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 93 (1998)).
7 Id. (citing FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 52 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982)).
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protectorates of the Crown.8  Recognition of this “nation” status has continued
to the present day.
In the United States, the Constitution allows Congress to regulate every
economic and commercial aspect of relationships with Indian tribes via the
Commerce Clause.9  However, the application of the Commerce Clause is sub-
ject to Constitutional limitations and legislative branch review; this limitation
recognizes the fact that Indian tribes have authority to enter into international
agreements among sovereigns.10  As a consequence, it is the executive branch
of the U.S. government that deals primarily with Indian affairs.
The Marshall Trilogy of cases delineated tribes’ legal and political stand-
ing.11  Within the Trilogy, the Supreme Court declared that tribes lacked the
legal authority to transfer or alienate their lands or to enter into treaties with
sovereigns other than the United States.12  However, the Court held that tribes
possessed the right to self-government, subject to Federal congressional con-
trol, but free from individual state interference.13  Short of being complete sov-
ereigns, tribes were reduced to independent peoples with the right of self-
government, as wards under the United States.14
To this day, tribal recognition by the federal government bestows “the
protection, services, and benefits of the Federal government available to Indian
tribes by virtue of their status as tribes . . . [and] the immunities and privileges
available to other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their gov-
ernment-to-government relationship with the United States as well as the
responsibilities, powers, limitations and obligations of such tribes.”15  This
pledge seeks to protect the sovereign character of Indian tribes.  Sovereignty is
“the absolute power of a nation to determine its own course of action with
respect to other nations,”16 and to be governed by one’s own laws.17  A tribe’s
authority to adopt and enforce its own laws stems from this inherent sover-
eignty,18 and it is this status as a sovereign that gives the tribe the benefit of
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.19  Tribal sovereign immu-
nity in particular is a federal common law doctrine stemming from the 1919
8 Id. (citing Appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of
the American Indian Nations: The Cherokee Nation of Indians, et al. v. Georgia, 8 KANS.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 163 (1999)).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Indians not taxed); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian
Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (Indians not taxed).
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (denoting the treaty power possessed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate).
11 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12 Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 1183, 1188 (2000).
13 Id. at 1186-87.
14 Id. at 1188, 1193.
15 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (1994).
16 Vine Deloria, Jr., Self Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERI-
CAN SOVEREIGNTY 118, 118 (John R. Wunder ed. 1999).
17 Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Governing Economic Activi-
ties in Indian Country, 2 Ann.2001 ATLA-CLE 1861 (2001) (citations omitted).
18 Id.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Supreme Court decision of Turner v. United States,20 which defined the basic
framework of the doctrine.21  Although this framework has several key charac-
teristics, for our purposes, the most salient aspects are that tribal sovereign
immunity can be waived by the affected tribe or abrogated by Congress.
Since Turner, the Supreme Court has issued five leading decisions outlin-
ing the doctrine’s scope and continued applicability.22  Twenty years after Tur-
ner, the Supreme Court held that “Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization.”23  This rule is reiterated in Puyallap Tribe v.
Department of Game,24 where the Court found that the state had no jurisdiction
absent the tribe’s consent to suit or congressional “waiver” of immunity.25  In
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,26 the Court held that “in the absence of an
‘unequivocal expression’ of contrary intent,” Congress had not intended to sub-
ject tribes to suit for claims under the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act27 and “their
immunity therefore barred any suit.”28  Two subsequent decisions further
entrenched the doctrine of sovereign immunity.29  The first decision was
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,30 in
which the Court declined the plaintiff’s request to reconsider the doctrine, pre-
ferring to defer the task of “dispens[ing] with . . . tribal immunity or . . .
limit[ing] it” to the legislative branch.31
In the second case, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,32 a
Kiowan tribal entity contracted with non-tribal creditors whereby the chairman
of the tribe’s business committee executed a promissory note payable to the
creditors.  The tribe defaulted, the creditors sued and the tribe moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity.33  The tribe’s
motion was dismissed both at trial and on appeal, with both courts holding that
the creditors could sue the tribe for commercial activity.34  When it reached the
Supreme Court, however, the majority noted that despite “reasons to doubt the
wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine,” and in light of the increasingly commer-
cial context in which tribes operate, the Court’s sentiment was still in prefer-
ence of “defer[ring] to the role [of] Congress.”35  The Court noted that
Congress had not explicitly distinguished between matters of tribal governance
and tribal commercial activity and so the creditors’ suit was dismissed.36
20 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
21 Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, THE ADVOCATE, May 2007, at 19, 19.
22 Id.
23 United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 512 (1940) (citations omitted).
24 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
25 Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted).
26 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1996).
27 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 - 1303 (2006).
28 Smith, supra note 21, at 19 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59
(1978)).
29 Id.
30 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
31 Id. at 510.
32 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 758.
36 Id.
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the situation before the Court was
unique.37  He disagreed with the majority’s broad application of the doctrine to
the commercial context:
[D]espite the broad language used in prior cases, it is quite wrong for the Court to
suggest that it is merely following precedent, for we have simply never considered
whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the tribe’s
land or its sovereign functions.38
According to Justice Stevens, “the Court’s broad interpretation of tribal
immunity risks usurping Congress’ superior authority to set the doctrine’s con-
tours[, unfairly] accord[ed] tribes stronger immunity . . . than exist[ed] for other
sovereigns [(including the United States),] and unjustly denie[d] recovery to . . .
many potential plaintiffs[.]”39  Even the majority, while ultimately deciding in
favor of the tribe, made a noteworthy concession:40 “The rationale [for apply-
ing immunity to tribal business entities], it must be said, can be challenged as
inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond
traditional tribal customs and activities.”41  Indeed, the Court held that certain
tribal undertakings or omissions42 will, in some cases, cause a tribe’s “embers
of sovereignty to grow cold.”43  In terms of contractual obligations, entrance
into the public commercial sphere could certainly fall under this analogy.  Tri-
bal gaming clearly constitutes a commercial activity that does not, it is argued
here, “touch on core tribal sovereignty concerns” of self-governance.44  The
justification for tribunal immunity is thereby diminished, if not eliminated.
Notwithstanding over eighty years of relevant case law, no single substan-
tive issue in Indian law currently produces more judicial attention than sover-
eign immunity.45  Less attention has been paid however, to the “complex and
nuanced”46 ramifications of sovereign immunity in the arena of bankruptcy
law.  A general rule is that federally recognized Indian tribes are immune from
suit by any entity or individual, absent the tribe’s consent or abrogation by
Congress.47  However, defining these two parameters is more difficult than a
first reading might suggest.  As a common law doctrine, tribal immunity is not
37 Id. at 764.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Courtney J. A. DaCosta, When “Turnabout” Is Not “Fair Play”: Tribal Immunity Under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO L.J. 515, 520 (2008) (citing Kiowa Tribe, 523
U.S. at 764-66).
40 Andrea M. Kurak, Florida Paraplegic Association v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Flor-
ida: Balancing Competing Interests, 30 STETSON L. REV. 361, 373 (2001) (citing Kiowa
Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757-58).
41 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757-58.
42 See Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005) (citations omitted) (hold-
ing that the tribe no longer enjoyed sovereignty over a piece of land it had reclaimed after
not having possessed it for approximately 200 years and reasoning that “‘standards of fed-
eral Indian law and federal equity practice’ preclude[d] the Tribe from rekindling its extin-
guished embers of sovereignty”).
43 DaCosta, supra note 39, at 524 (citing Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214).
44 Id. at 552.
45 Smith, supra note 21, at 19.
46 BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS
154 (4th ed. 2006).
47 Smith, supra note 21, at 19.
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expressly granted by any act of Congress, yet it remains subject to any limita-
tions that Congress may impose.  “The doctrine . . .  remains intact [primarily]
because limitations proposed by the legislature . . . do not [usually] survive . . .
judicial scrutiny.”48
Another issue in the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that of consent.  In
Robles v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,49 the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
term “‘sovereign immunity’ is generally associated with immunity from tort
claims” and that in contract cases “the question would be whether, by entering
into the contract, the tribal corporation subjected itself to suit.”50  Inherent to
any standard creditor-debtor agreement is a stipulation that, should the debtor
become insolvent, creditors are to be paid from whatever is left over before any
residual equity is dispersed amongst company owners.  The question then
becomes whether Foxwoods’ undertaking to agree to, and be bound by, such
terms constitutes consent.  The following section will therefore examine issues
surrounding immunity waivers as well as Congress’ abrogative powers.
A. Waiver of Immunity
In the tribal sovereignty lexicon, consent is often referred to as “waiver.”
Tribal immunity can be waived in any one of three ways: under contract,
through litigation and through “corporate” action.51
Courts have found, in certain circumstances, that tribal immunity is
waived where tribes consent to contractual provisions which provide
counterparties with legal recourse against the tribes.  Contractual waiver is
addressed in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe.52  There, the unanimous court held that an arbitration provision in the
contract constituted valid consent to waive immunity.53  It is unknown whether
the contract between Foxwoods and its creditors has a similar provision.  How-
ever, the holding in C & L Enterprises is persuasive evidence that, when a
tribal entity enters into a private commercial contract, that entity can be bound
by its terms.  Further, should the entity default on its contractual obligations, it
should not be able to cloak itself in the warm blanket of tribal immunity.
In determining whether a tribe has waived its protection with sufficient
clarity of intent, courts are required to take a “practical, commonsense
approach”54 in discerning the parties’ intentions.  Although we do not have
access to the contract, one can assume that both Foxwoods and its creditors are
sufficiently sophisticated in the business domain to have included explicit lan-
48 Kurak, supra note 40, at 366 (citing Deloria, Jr., supra note 16, at 121 (1996)) (additional
citation omitted).
49 876 P.2d 134 (Idaho 1994).
50 Id. at 136 n.5.
51 Smith, supra note 21, at 20.
52 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
53 Id. at 422 (citations omitted) (The court held that the provision “has a real world objec-
tive; it is not designed for regulation of a game lacking practical consequences. And to the
real world end, the contract specifically authorizes judicial enforcement. . . .”).
54 E.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21,
31 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“. . . whether the language of [the agreement] might
have hoodwinked an unsophisticated Indian negotiator into giving up the tribe’s immunity
from suit without realizing he was doing so.”).
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guage addressing this issue.  Considering the billions of dollars at stake, it is
hard to imagine either party lacking the requisite experience, counsel, and
savvy that would give rise to the hoodwinking envisioned by some courts.55  In
addition, it is standard practice for creditors to be paid before equity holders in
bankruptcy.  The commonsense approach begs a finding of consensual, con-
tractual waiver.
With respect to waiving immunity by way of litigation, the Supreme Court
in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty56 explained that where a
tribe commences a suit against a non-tribal private party in state or federal
court, the tribe waives immunity with respect to the issue at hand.57  The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed corporate action waiver,58 which is unfor-
tunate because therein lies the fundamental distinction between sovereign tribes
and corporate tribal entities.59  Although most courts recognize this distinc-
tion,60 the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to draw a clear line
between the intra-tribal affairs of a sovereign tribe and the commercial activi-
ties of tribal corporations.  Foxwoods should not be permitted to invoke the
sovereign immunity of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe where its commercial
dealings with non-tribal entities are defined by contractual relationships that
recognize the possibility of suit.
Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”)61 authorizes the Sec-
retary of the Interior to issue to tribes charters of incorporation under which
tribes are given “powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate busi-
ness.”62  Enabling tribes “to conduct business through th[e] modern device”63
of corporations has been described as the “animating purpose”64 of Section 17.
In enacting IRA, Congress was attempting to draw the distinction between the
sovereign identity of a tribal government and the corporate identity of a tribal
corporation.65  Indeed, “encouraging tribal independence and attractiveness as
55 Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 660
(7th Cir. 1996).
56 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
57 Id. at 513. (i.e., it is subject to counter- and cross-claims).
58 Smith, supra note 21, at 20 (citing Request for Interpretive Opinion on the Separability of
Tribal Organizations Organized Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act,
Opinion No. M-36515, 65 Interior Dec. 483, 484 (1958) [hereinafter IRA Separability
Opinion]).
59 See e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d 315, 320 (10th Cir. 1981) (“The
trial judge recognized that the [tribe’s] constitutional and corporate entities [are] separate and
distinct . . . [T]he record supports . . . the district court’s findings.”).
60 Linneen v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ramey
Constr. Co., 673 F.2d at 320) (“The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476, authorizes
Indian tribes to organize as a constitutional entity, and § 477 of the Act authorizes organiza-
tion of a corporate entity.  Most courts that have considered the issue have recognized the
distinctiveness of these two entities.”).
61 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006).
62 Id.
63 IRA Separability Opinion, supra note 58, at 483-84.
64 Smith, supra note 21, at 20 (citations omitted).
65 See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 476 - 477 (2006).  A tribal “organization” refers to one of
governmental purposes.  A tribal “incorporation” conducts business operations.
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a business partner justifies such a distinction.”66  Put another way, an incorpo-
rated structure is familiar to the market and, consequently, a more attractive
vehicle for investment, especially as it relates to investor/creditor confidence.
Unfortunately, the provisions of IRA fall short of addressing the issue of immu-
nity abrogation.
Many Section 17 charters include explicit waivers of immunity, generally
referred to as “sue and be sued” (“SABS”) provisions.  Although SABS clauses
are aimed at tribal corporations, there have been disagreements over whether a
particular undertaking is that of the tribal corporate entity (which can be sued)
or whether it is “sufficiently sovereign” to be an undertaking of the tribe itself
(which cannot be sued).67  In Linneen v. Gila River Indian Community,68 the
court held that the tribe had not waived its immunity because the subject matter
forming the basis of the suit was governmental rather than corporate in nature:
[S]ue and be sued” clauses waive immunity with respect to a tribe’s corporate activi-
ties, but not with respect to its governmental activities. . . . The “sue and be sued”
clause in the [Gila River Indian] Community’s corporate charter in no way affects the
sovereign immunity of the Community as a constitutional, or governmental, entity.69
The difference between actions taken in a corporate capacity and those
taken as a sovereign is a question of fact.70  Complicating the issue further,
however, is the fact that SABS provisions, in and of themselves, do not consti-
tute an effective waiver—there must also be express approval of the decision to
waive on the part of the tribe.71  Again, without being able to examine the
Foxwoods contract, we can only presume that the creditors (and their lawyers),
being sufficiently sophisticated, included such waiver or dispute resolution pro-
visions in the loan agreement.
Finally, it should be noted that whereas U.S. states can impliedly waive
immunity by participating in areas under federal constitutional regulation, such
as commerce,72 tribal waiver cannot be implied; it must be clear73 and unequiv-
ocal.74  However, the Supreme Court has also held that the use of talismanic
66 Kurak, supra note 40, at 377 (citing Julie A. Clement, Note, Strengthening Autonomy by
Waiving Sovereign Immunity: Why Indian Tribes Should Be “Foreign” under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 14 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 653, 654 (1997)).
67 Smith, supra note 21, at 20 (citations omitted).
68 276 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2002).
69 Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted).
70 Smith, supra note 21, at 20.
71 Edward Rubacha, Construction Contracts with Indian Tribes or on Tribal Lands, 26
CONSTR. LAW 12, 12 (2006) (citing Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845, 850 (N.M.
1988)).
72 Wambi Awanwicake Wastewin, Federal Courts – Indians: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Seminole Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity, 73 N.D. L.
REV. 517, 529 (1996) [hereinafter Wastewin] (citations omitted).
73 C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001) (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991)) (“. . . to relinquish its immunity, a tribe’s waiver must be ‘clear’.”).
74 E.g., Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F. 3d 343, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1996)) (“[C]ongressional abrogation . . .
cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”).
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terms such as “sovereign immunity” are not required to constitute a valid
waiver.75
B. Congressional Abrogation
Congress possesses plenary power to abrogate tribal immunity,76 subject
only to the qualification that in order for there to be a valid abrogation of sover-
eign immunity, the Congressional intent to do so must be unequivocally
expressed.77  Where federal legislation is silent about its applicability to Indian
tribes, courts will have to establish whether a particular law is relevant to tribes.
This is a question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed de novo.78  If the
statute is found to apply to the tribe, the court will then have to establish
whether the tribe—or tribal corporation—is subject to private suit.
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that “court[s] should be partic-
ularly cautious of substituting [their] policy judgment for that of Congress in
this area.”79  However, one such area in which “courts are willing to pierce
what once appeared to be impenetrable sovereignty” is where it concerns “gen-
eral” statutes or statutes of “general applicability.”80  The Supreme Court held
in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Tribe81 that the Federal
Power Act,82 a “broad general statute,” included Indian tribes as well as their
property interests.83  Similarly, it was held in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal
Farm84 that because the Occupational Safety and Health Act is “a statute of
general applicability and broad remedial purpose . . . [its] coverage is compre-
hensive . . . [and therefore] clearly includes the [tribe].”85  The court concluded
this point by stating, “we have not adopted the proposition that Indian tribes are
subject only to those laws of the United States expressly made applicable to
them.  Nor do we do so here.”86  It is in this vein that the Code may also apply
to Foxwoods.
75 Rubacha, supra note 71, at 12 (citing C & L Enters., Inc., 532 U.S. at 420).
76 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (noting that the immunity “aspect of tribal sover-
eignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress”).
77 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
78 Rubacha, supra note 71, at 12 (citations omitted).
79 Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 147 P. 3d 1275, 1286 (Wash. 2006) (citing Kiowa
Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1998)).
80 Kurak, supra note 40, at 367 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Tribe, 362
U.S. 99, 116 (1960)).
81 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
82 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 (repealed 1953) - 828(c) (2006).
83 Fed. Power Comm’n, 362 U.S. at 116.
84 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
85 Id. at 1115.
86 Id. at 1116.
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III. INDIAN BUSINESS INCENTIVES: TAX BREAKS AND THE INDIAN TRIBAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CONTRACT ENCOURAGEMENT ACT
Indian tribes control 56 million acres of land, which are essential to
improving their economies.87  Development of tourism, exploitation of natural
resources (e.g., fishery and forestry) and facilitation of commerce are the pri-
mary means of accomplishing this.88
Several unique factors spur the development of tribal commerce and busi-
ness.  The Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act89 allows tribes to raise funds
for the construction of private manufacturing facilities on reservations by issu-
ing bonds with tax-exempt interest income.  Business property on tribal reser-
vations is also eligible for rapid depreciation, and there are income tax
incentives available for employing tribal members.90  In addition, some tribes
offer tax breaks to attract businesses.91
To further encourage commercial development, the Indian Tribal Eco-
nomic Development and Contract Encouragement Act was signed into law in
2000.92  Its purpose was to revamp legislation governing tribal and non-tribal
party contracts, which had been left untouched for more than a century.93  The
old 1872 Section 81 put stringent contractual drafting requirements on the non-
tribal party and required the endorsement of both the Secretary of the Interior
and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.94  Failure of the non-tribal party to
meet these contractual prerequisites would render the contract null and void,
and force the non-tribal party to return any funds “paid by the Tribal party in
excess of the amount set by the Secretary for such services or goods.”95  The
old 1872 Section 81 also allowed third parties to bring qui tam suits under the
null-and-void clause.96
The scope of the 1872 Section 81 protections is limited by the 2000 Sec-
tion 81.  The latter “only covers contracts which ‘encumber Indian lands for a
period of 7 or more years[,]’”97 a drastic departure from the 1872 coverage of
any contract between a tribal and non-tribal party “relative to their lands.”98
The 2000 Section 81 is also without the stringent drafting requirements and
87 See generally FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 15 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed. 2005) [hereinafter “COHEN”].
88 Id.
89 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(1),(f) (2006 & Supp. III 2009); see generally COHEN, supra note 87,
§ 21.03(2)(d).
90 26 U.S.C.A. § 168(j) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-240, effective Sept. 27,
2010).  These rules apply to property put in service prior to December 31, 2005.
91 See generally COHEN, supra note 87, § 21.02(4).
92 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006).
93 Id.
94 Anna-Emily C. Gaupp, The Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encour-
agement Act of 2000: Smoke Signals of a New Era in Federal Indian Policy?, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 667, 669-70 (2001) (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 670 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006)).
96 Id. at 669.
97 Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act, S.B. 613, 106th
Cong., Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000). See also Gaupp, supra note 94, at 679
(citing S.B. 613).
98 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006).
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instead enumerates those contractual provisions which warrant refusal by the
Secretary.99  In addition, it requires that a contractual provision “either disclos-
ing or addressing tribal immunity from suit” be included in contracts covered
by the Act.100
Fortunately, the 2000 statute addressed the concern that its predecessor’s
methods and procedures created unpredictability/uncertainty for the non-tribal
party; by addressing sovereign immunity, it provides a remedy for the non-
tribal party if a tribe breaches its obligations.  In effect, the 2000 statute affords
the tribal party the unfettered ability to draft and enter into contracts at its sole
discretion, provided that any resulting encumbrance of Indian lands last for no
more than seven years.101  Thus, the vast majority of business dealings and
day-to-day contracts fall outside the statutory reach and continue to be subject
to tribal sovereign immunity.
Anna-Emily C. Gaupp, however, argues that the 2000 legislation catches
the large-scale gaming resort development contracts,102 thereby making it less
risky for non-tribal parties to enter into financing arrangements with tribes.103
Gaupp also argues that the 2000 legislation ensures that the tribal and non-tribal
parties negotiate on equal footing.104  The non-tribal party negotiates for a
waiver of sovereign immunity due to the waiver clause, although, “waiver is
already the common practice.”105  In turn, the tribal party is able to negotiate
for better financing because, due to the removal of the null-and-void clause and
the third party qui tam standing, the non-tribal party can sell tribal obligations
on the secondary market as a derivative investment without the debt-purchaser
uncertainty of judicial intervention.106
It is important to note that in order to establish a common and predictable
legal system, tribes must consider whether to adopt the Uniform Commercial
Code, in whole or in part, or to develop their own laws governing commercial
exchanges.  Article 2 (sales of goods) and Article 9 (secured transactions)
ought to be adopted,107 as should corporation codes.108  Contracts entered into
between tribal and non-tribal parties are thus often governed by an interaction
of laws.  For example, a contract involving a lease may be governed by the
tribe’s enactment of Article 2 and by the 2000 Section 81 of the Indian Tribal
99 See Guapp, supra note 94, at 681 (citing S.B. 613, § 2(d)).
100 S. REP. NO. 106-150, at 1 (1999). See Gaupp, supra note 94, at 682 (citing S. REP. No.
106-150, at 1).
101 S.B. 613, § 2.
102 Gaupp, supra note 94, at 689.
103 However, we wonder whether tribes could simply structure deals on a six year renewal
basis, for instance, akin to many government outsourcing deals (i.e., the casino lease could
simply expire every six years and require renewal at the tribes’ discretion, as to avoid the
seven year rule), or perhaps one could argue that tribal gaming is not an agreement or con-
tract with an “Indian tribe” per se, and is therefore outside the ambit of the Act, or even if
within the Act’s confines, perhaps the tribal entity could be sold or assigned to other intra-
tribal entities on a five year basis, escaping the rule once again.
104 Gaupp, supra note 94, at 689.
105 Id. at 682.
106 See generally id. at 681, 683-84, 688 (citations omitted).
107 Fred H. Miller & Duchess Bartmess, 2000 Native American Law Symposium: Uniform
Laws: Possible Useful Tribal Legislation, 36 TULSA L. J. 305, 315 (2000).
108 See generally COHEN, supra note 87, § 21.02(5)(b).
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Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act if the contract covers
a period of seven or more years.
Tribal sovereign immunity will be an issue via the Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contract Encouragement Act if the contract deals with the
encumbrance of tribal land for seven years or more.  Tribes will often grant
limited immunity waivers so as to assure lenders of being able to tap the tried-
and-tested federal and state jurisdiction if the arrangement goes sour.  As ear-
lier noted, such waivers need to be clear and unambiguous.109  The reality is
that sovereign immunity continues to play a distinct role in tribal financing
arrangements.  Understanding its applicability to business relationships is
important for both parties.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
In the debtor-creditor relationship, the federal Bankruptcy Code provides
equitable solutions for both parties should the relationship break down.  Bank-
ruptcy legislation is comprehensive by design “to secure an equality of distribu-
tion of the assets of the bankrupt among his creditors.”110
The Code111 is written with social and economic concerns in mind.  “It is
the twofold purpose of the [B]ankruptcy [A]ct . . . to convert the estate of the
bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then to give the bank-
rupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the [Act] left
untouched.”112  The Code also provides a fresh start to the debtor with “a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pres-
sure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”113
A. Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Code
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has characterized the
interplay between Congressional abrogation and the Code as “a complex and
serious issue”114 worthy of further study.115  The conflict arises between the
109 See e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (employ-
ment application and employee manual stating that the tribe would comply with applicable
federal employment law did not waive tribal sovereign immunity because the statements
were not “clear”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. McCor, 903 So.2d 353, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (“Although it may be a plausible inference that the purchase of insurance indicates an
intention to assume liability and waive tribal immunity, such an inference is not a proper
basis for concluding that there was a clear waiver by the Tribe.”).
110 Wood v. Wilbert’s Sons Shingle & Lumber Co., 226 U.S. 384, 387 (1912).  This case
refers to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (also known as the Nelson Act), ch. 541, 55th Cong.,
30 Stat. 544 (1898), which was the first successful federal legislation on bankruptcy laws.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was superseded by The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), which contains most of the current
laws on bankruptcy.
111 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. amended by the Bankruptcy Technical Corrections
Act of 2010, H.R. 6198, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010)).
112 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1974) (quoting Burlingham v. Crouse, 228
U.S. 459, 473 (1913)).
113 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 244 (1934) (other citations omitted)) (quotations omitted).
114 In re Nat’l Cattle Cong., 91 F.3d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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power of Congress to exercise its power pursuant to the Code and a tribe’s
status as a sovereign entity.116
Pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Congress has inherent juris-
diction to enact “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States.”117  The Code is a manifestation of this power and it provides
federal district courts with jurisdiction118 over “all persons who are present
within the territorial boundaries of the United States.”119  Naturally, this
includes corporate entities120 as “persons” at law.  In addition, because
Foxwoods is located in Connecticut, it is equally clear that it meets the criteria
of being inside the “territorial boundaries” of the United States.
The Code provides that a court may “issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate”121 to enforce bankruptcy law on the parties
subject to it.  It is therefore necessary to establish whether Foxwoods is such a
party.  The Code’s definition of “governmental unit” includes foreign states and
“other foreign or domestic government[s].”122  As a matter of interpretation,
Foxwoods would seem to fall under at least one of these categories.  Indeed, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that Indian tribes are
included in Section 101(27)’s definition.123  This would seem to suggest that
the creditors have a valid claim, insofar as they are authorized to enforce that
claim against the debtor (Foxwoods).124  In order to give force and effect to this
claim, the Code further provides that one party’s interest (e.g., the tribal equity
claim) may be subordinated to the interest of the other (e.g., the non-tribal debt
claim), thus ensuring that creditors are paid first.125
Under the Constitution, “General Acts of Congress” (i.e. laws of general
applicability) do not apply to Indian tribes unless unequivocally expressed in
the particular statute.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Federal Power Com-
115 John M. Czarnetzky, When the Dealer Goes Bust: Issues in Casino Bankruptcies, 18
MISS. C. L. REV. 459, 474 (1998) (citing In re Nat’l Cattle Cong., 91 F.3d at 1114).
116 Sean McFarland, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction Over Tribal Creditors: Lower Brule
Construction Co. v. Sheesley’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309, 314
(1990-1991).
117 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 4.
118 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006).
119 BLUM, supra note 46, at 128.
120 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(9)(A) (West 2010) amended by the Bankruptcy Technical Correc-
tions Act of 2010, H.R. 6198, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010)).
121 Id. § 105(a) (West 2010).
122 Id. § 101(27) (West 2010) amended by the Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, H.R. 6198, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010)).
123 Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(27) (West 2010)).
124 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2006).
125 Id. § 510(c)(1) (2006).  Under this section, a court may subordinate any claim or interest
to any other claim or interest, under the principles of equitable subordination.  It should be
noted, however, that this is an extraordinary remedy and courts have generally held that the
following conditions must be satisfied before it will be imposed: the claimant must have
engaged in some kind of inequitable conduct; the misconduct must have resulted in injury to
the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and equitable
subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.
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mission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation126  stated that, “a general statute in terms
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.”127  The
Eighth Circuit has shown similar sentiment, declaring that, “while the Supreme
Court has expressed its protectiveness of tribal sovereign immunity by requir-
ing that any waiver be explicit, it has never required the invocation of magic
words stating that the tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity.”128  Thus, it
appears that the inclusion of governmental units in the provisions of the Code,
while falling short of “magic words,” is sufficiently explicit to include tribes in
their application.
In order to assist with the “threshold inquiry”129 of “whether an otherwise
silent but general statute applies to tribes[,]” the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm130 adopted a three-pronged test:
A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to
Indian tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law touches “exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters”; (2) the application of the law to the tribe
would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties”; or (3) there is proof “by legis-
lative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to
Indians on their reservations[.]”131
The court concluded that the operation of what was, in that case, a com-
mercial venture did not fall into any of these categories.  In both Donovan and
the case at hand, the relevant statutes are ones of general applicability.
Applying the test in Donovan to the case at hand, it is apparent that the
Code is sufficiently general to include tribes within its ambit.  First, the Code
does not touch on the self-governmental rights of the Mashantucket Pequots
because the relationship involved is between Foxwoods and outside commer-
cial actors.  The bankruptcy proceedings, as they affect the commercial acts of
Foxwoods, are separate and distinct from the sovereign acts of the tribe.  Sec-
ond, the only treaty right that is relevant in the instant case is immunity itself,
which the Code, it is argued here, abrogates.  Third, there is nothing in the
Code—a manifestation of Congress’ intent—to suggest that Congress did not
intend for the provisions in the Code to apply to tribes.  On the contrary, the
Code’s section regarding waiver of immunity explicitly includes governmental
units in its language.
Perhaps the most helpful case in delineating the jurisdictional scope of the
Code is Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation.132  There, the Ninth Circuit read
“governmental unit” to include tribes and found that they can be held subject to
suit in adversary proceedings brought under the Code.133  “Section 106 is not
[merely] a ‘general authorization for suit in federal court’ of the kind held
insufficiently explicit to abrogate state immunity,”134 but rather, “specifically
126 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
127 Id.
128 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1995).
129 Smith, supra note 21, at 21.
130 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
131 Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
132 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).
133 Id. at 1057-58 (citations omitted).
134 Bankruptcy Code’s Abrogation of Tribes’ Sovereign Immunity is Sufficiently Explicit, 16
Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 161, 161 (2004) [hereinafter “BNA”] (citing Atascadero State Hosp.
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abrogates the sovereign immunity of governmental units, a defined class that is
largely made up of parties that could claim sovereign immunity. . . .  No impli-
cation beyond the words of the statute is necessary to conclude that Congress
‘unequivocally expressed’ its intent to abrogate Indian tribes’ immunity.”135
The decision goes on to state that Congress “need not make its intent to abro-
gate ‘unmistakably clear’ in a single section of a statute,”136 but rather the
statute must be read as a whole137 to establish whether abrogation was
intended.  In this case, both the plain language of the Code, as well as its nature
of general application, make clear Congress’ intent to abrogate immunity in
bankruptcy.
The Code explicitly accounts for the possibility that a governmental unit
may claim sovereign immunity in order to avoid its duties in bankruptcy.  Sec-
tion 106 states that, “[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set
forth in this section with respect to . . . Sections 105 [Power of Court and] 502
[Allowance of claims or interests]. . . .”138  Section 106(a)(2) authorizes the
court to hear and determine any issue under Sections 105 and 502 in proceed-
ings involving a governmental unit, and Section 106(a)(3) empowers the court
to issue orders and judgments against them.139  In Krystal Energy, Judge
Berzon held that the Code’s abrogation of governmental unit immunity, “while
not expressly mentioning ‘Indian tribes,’ [was] sufficiently explicit to override
tribal immunity [in] bankruptcy proceedings”:140
The definition of “governmental unit” first lists a sub-set of all governmental bodies,
but then adds a catch-all phrase, ‘or other foreign or domestic governments’ . . .
Thus, all foreign and domestic governments, including but not limited to those par-
ticularly enumerated in the first part of the definition, are considered ‘governmental
units’ for the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, and, under § 106(a), are subject to
suit.141
Concluding on this point, the court held that tribes are “simply a specific
member” under the Code’s umbrella term for domestic governments, which is
sufficient evidence of Congressional intention to abrogate immunity.  Just as
Congress need not list each U.S. state separately in a federal law of general
application, it need not list tribes among the various domestic governments
referred to in Section 106 of the Code.142
B. Corporate vs. Governmental: The Distinction
In Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,143 the Supreme Court noted that a sover-
eign state engaging in commercial activities is “not exercis[ing] powers pecu-
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)) (discussing Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
2004)).
135 Krystal Energy, 357 F.3d at 1060.
136 Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).
137 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 74 (2000).
138 11 U.S.C.A. § 106(a)(1) (West 2010).  These are the two powers discussed.
139 BLUM, supra note 46, at 157.
140 BNA, supra note 134, at 161.
141 Krystal Energy, 357 F.3d at 1057 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(27) (West 2010)).
142 BNA, supra note 134, at 161.
143 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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liar to sovereigns” but rather, “powers that can also be exercised by private
citizens.”144  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)145 defines a
commercial activity as being “either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act,”146 with the added caveat that it
must have an effect in the United States.147
The cited purpose of, and justifications for, tribal immunity—self-suffi-
ciency, self-determination, etc.—is irrelevant to this determination of effect.
“The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
by reference to its purpose.”148  Thus, where a sovereign nation exercises such
commercial power (i.e., the power to engage in business149), it will not be enti-
tled to immunity under FSIA.  A natural extension of this principle should be
that where a sovereign corporation—i.e., not the sovereign itself—engages in
commercial dealings, immunity will likewise not apply.
The requirement that the commercial activity have an effect in the United
States is satisfied for the simple reason that the agreement is between
Foxwoods and non-tribal investors.  It is given that Foxwoods’ securities are
subject to the regulations of U.S. accounting standards, exchange
intermediaries and reporting agencies and transactional funds flow in and out of
the financial institutions of America (e.g., banks, trusts, bond markets, stock
exchanges, etc.).  As these effects clearly occur in the non-tribal domain of the
United States, the courts necessarily have the statutory authority to enforce
compliance with applicable laws.150
Currently, it is uncertain whether tribes fall under the banner of “foreign
nation” sufficient to trigger the judicial statutory authority of FSIA.  The Com-
merce Clause151 specifically distinguishes between “Foreign Nations,” “the
Several States,” and “Indian Tribes,” which suggests they are to be treated sep-
arately.152  To this, Andrea M. Kurak argues:
Treating tribes as “foreign nations” [under FSIA] would allow courts more leeway to
draw a distinction between tribal governance and tribes as marketplace participants.
Rather than defer to Congress, as the Court chose to do in Kiowa, courts could utilize
preexisting legislation that distinguishes between governance and commercial activ-
ity.  If immunity exceptions applicable to foreign sovereigns were applied to tribal
sovereignty, the immunity would remain intact with respect to intra-tribal and gov-
ernmental affairs and only abrogated when tribes choose to enter the marketplace.153
144 Id. at 614 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704
(1976).
145 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611 (2006).
146 Id. § 1603(d) (2006).
147 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (2006)).
148 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006).
149 Kurak, supra note 40, at 384 (citing Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (discussing Alfred Dun-
hill, 425 U.S. at 704).
150 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (“Because New York was thus the place of performance for
[the tribe’s] ultimate contractual obligations . . . those obligations necessarily had a ‘direct
effect’ in the United States.”).
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
152 Kurak, supra note 40, at 382 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18
(1831)).
153 Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
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Essentially, if tribes were considered “foreign nations” under FSIA, then
courts could rely on the distinction drawn in the legislation that separates gov-
ernance from commerce.  This distinction provides that commercial activities
are not subject to the protection of sovereign immunity.
C. Justifications for Immunity: Flawed Reasoning
The courts’ reluctance to abrogate immunity may have less to do with lack
of jurisdiction than with a misguided attempt at furthering Congress’ stated
goal of promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency.154  A variety of reasons
support this theory.  First, tribal nations have been largely dependent on the
support of the federal government; gaming is seen as holding the potential to
“reduce the tribes’ involuntary but longstanding reliance on federal funding”155
by providing revenues for services, infrastructure and other means of govern-
mental self-sufficiency.
Second, tribal gaming is a significant source of income for many tribes.
Recognizing this, Congress sought to enact a statutory scheme to encourage
what is perceived as a means to economic self-sufficiency.156  Under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),157 Congress held that “a principle goal of
Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal government.”158  Because economic self-suffi-
ciency is a necessary condition precedent to social and political independence,
one author notes that “[i]t is ironic that economic self-sufficiency is typically a
prerequisite to sovereign status, but in the case of [Indian] tribes, fostering eco-
nomic stability characteristic of a sovereign is the primary justification for
retaining tribal sovereign immunity.”159
From Foxwoods’ perspective, decisions that bolster the doctrine of tribal
immunity may be hailed as beneficial,160 but in reality, they reveal the disad-
vantages to entering into a business relationship with an entity that is not sub-
ject to suit.  The “self-sufficiency through immunity” argument holds that
sovereign protection is necessary in order to foster tribal economic progress
and is integral to the self-governance of tribes.161  A closer examination reveals
that, in the commercial context at least, such a rationale may be outdated and
even counter-productive.
In the commercial marketplace, immunity to suit likely presents more of a
hindrance than a benefit.162  Although the stated justification for retaining
immunity is to encourage the economic development of tribal communities,
denying legal protection to non-tribal investors renders the tribal entity less
154 Id. at 378-79 (citing Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casino
Gaming: Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 COR-
NELL L. REV. 798, 812, 819-21 (1999)).
155 Goldin, supra note 154, at 812.
156 Kurak, supra note 40, at 362 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006)).
157 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
158 Id. § 2701(4) (2006).
159 Kurak, supra note 40, at 367.
160 Wastewin, supra note 72, at 540-42 (citations omitted).
161 Rubacha, supra note 71, at 12.
162 Clement, supra note 66, at 654.
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attractive as an investment to the business community, thus impeding economic
gains.163  Whereas return on an investment or loan is commensurate with the
degree of risk involved, future creditors of Foxwoods will have to weigh not
only the risk of default, but the risk that a tribe may invoke immunity and
refuse to pay in any event.
Relying less on the shield of tribal immunity and more on their own viability as
active and successful marketplace participants would allow tribes to maximize the
benefits of commercial activity and more quickly obtain economic self-suffi-
ciency. . . . Through vigorous litigation intended to protect its sovereign immunity,
the tribe has asserted a shield against all who may challenge its business practices.
However, this shield may be the sword that causes the tribe’s demise. . . .164
If the courts fail to take this opportunity to draw a clear line between
government and corporation—between Mashantucket Pequot and Foxwoods
Resort Casino—the sovereign shield of immunity may very well serve as the
sword that “tribal economic development”165 falls on.
Despite the stated economic rationale for upholding the doctrine of tribal
immunity (which, we submit, is flawed to begin with), the principles of equity
suggest a common sense, “back to basics” approach.  In United States v. State
Bank,166 Justice Swayne for the Supreme Court stated that “[a]n action will lie
whenever [a] defendant has received money which is the property of the plain-
tiff, and which the defendant is obliged by natural justice and equity to refund.
The form of the indebtedness or the mode in which it was incurred is
immaterial.”167
That decision was rendered forty-one years before the doctrine of tribal
immunity was put into effect in Turner, but insofar as it pertains to the princi-
ples of “natural justice and equity,” its reasoning is sound.  Foxwoods has
received money, which, for all intents and purposes, is the property of the cred-
itors.  Because Foxwoods took it upon itself to borrow money, natural justice
and equity dictate that they have a duty to pay it back, regardless of any special
status.
As an interesting comparison, tribes may actually have jurisdiction over
non-Indians in some cases.  The Supreme Court held in Montana v. United
States168 that “tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian [where]
(a) the non-Indian has a relevant consensual relationship with the tribe[,] or (b)
the non-Indian is doing something that imperils the tribe’s . . .  economic secur-
ity[ ] or . . . welfare.”169  Equating the tribe with the tribal entity, this reasoning
appears analogous to the case at hand, except that it operates in reverse.  The
agreement between Foxwoods and its creditors is obviously a “consensual rela-
tionship” of debtor-creditor, and Foxwoods—by refusing to pay back its credi-
tors—is doing something that “imperils the economic security” of non-Indian
creditors (or, it could be argued, U.S. debt markets).  Being that “sovereign
163 Kurak, supra note 40, at 377 (citing Clement, supra note 66, at 654).
164 Id. at 377, 390.
165 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2006).
166 96 U.S. 30, 35 (1877).
167 Id. (citing Bayne v. United States, 93 U.S. 642).
168 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
169 William Bacon, 20 Questions About Indian Law, THE ADVOCATE, May 2007, at 17, 17.
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immunity stems from notions of equality among sovereigns[,]”170 this one-way
street of risk is not conducive to long-term, harmonious business relationships
between tribes and the business community at large.
D. Passing the Buck on Sovereign Immunity
Tribal sovereign immunity is not impenetrable, and judges are not
required to apply it where it would run contrary to law and equity.  In the
majority of cases however, the doctrine will nonetheless be applied and upheld,
“often reaching inequitable results.”171  One of the reasons for this is that there
has historically been a back-and-forth between Congress and the courts,
whereby the former cannot muster the political will to limit the doctrine, and
the latter cannot justify the authority to keep from applying it—even where it
acknowledges a “patently unfair”172 result.  For example, in Kiowa the court
opted in favor of deferring to Congress the task of distinguishing between tribal
commercial activities and governmental ones.  However, under IRA, it is
apparent that Congress deferred to tribes, allowing them to make the distinction
for themselves.
“[B]y relying and referring to each other’s precedents and by deferring to
the power of each to resolve certain issues related to tribal sovereignty and
recognition of the doctrine of immunity, the branches [of the U.S. legal system]
largely preserve and perpetuate the status quo with respect to tribal immu-
nity.”173  When courts choose deference over statutory interpretation,174 they
perpetuate the trend of passing the buck, and, it may be argued, shirk their
responsibilities as arbiters of the law.
There are two possible solutions.  One is for Congress to enact specific
legislation delineating separation of the tribe from the tribal corporate enter-
prise.175  The second solution lies with the Supreme Court to draw the distinc-
tion (i.e., to re-consider Kiowa).  The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was
developed in the courts, and it is open for the courts to amend or limit it.  In
addition, the federal government itself has come to recognize that sovereign
immunity is not absolute.  FSIA gives the courts explicit power to adjudicate
matters of abrogation176 and specifically cites an exception to sovereign immu-
nity when the plaintiff’s claim “is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state[.]”177  Kurak proposes that adopting a
regime similar to FSIA—if not FSIA itself—would go a long way towards
170 Kurak, supra note 40, at 383.
171 Id. at 369.
172 Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1135 (11th
Cir. 1999).
173 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect
of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 762 (2002) (emphasis added).
174 See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (“[W]e decline to revisit
our case law and choose to defer to Congress.”).
175 Although this would certainly address the problem, an analysis of the political mechan-
ics involved are beyond the scope of this paper.
176 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States. . . .”).
177 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (“commercial activity” exception).
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alleviating some of the uncertainty: “Legislation similar to FSIA, explicitly sev-
ering tribal and commercial activities from tribal governmental functions,
would avoid the statute-by-statute interpretation that the courts now
undergo.”178
The courts and Congress have the power to abrogate immunity where they
see fit, but insofar as case-by-case determinations are concerned, it is apparent
that Congress wishes to leave the decision-making function with the courts.
Simply stated, Congress has made its intent plain and obvious.  It is incumbent
on the courts to make order out of chaos.
E. Intra-tribal disputes
In passing, we will discuss the issue of intra-tribal disputes, as they mark
an important departure from the proposed commercial relationship tribes ought
to have with non-tribal entities.  When the debtor-creditor relationship is char-
acterized by multiple tribal entities, federal courts have not recognized subject
matter jurisdiction over such disputes, preferring instead to characterize them
as intra-tribal.
In In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litiga-
tion,179 where tribal members issued a recall on the elected tribal council
administering the tribe’s gaming activities and the elected council subsequently
ignored it, the federal court that heard the action refused to assert jurisdiction
because the action was characterized as an intra-tribal dispute.180  After the
appointed council seized control of tribal gaming facilities, the elected tribal
council filed suit in federal court, alleging that the appointed council lacked
legal authority and that the elected council had exclusive control over the
tribe’s finances.  The appellate court agreed with the district court to the extent
that it was being asked to resolve an internal tribal leadership dispute, and that
IGRA did not provide a private right of action.181
Where business dealings are intra-tribal, it is unlikely that jurisdiction will
be afforded under the Code, and the tribal parties to the transaction will only
have a right of action in their respective tribal courts.
V. CONCLUSION: FIGHTING FAIRLY
When a tribe takes it upon itself to enter into the public marketplace, it
must be made subject not only to the relevant rules and regulations of the
respective jurisdiction, but also to the terms of its agreements.  By being
empowered to conduct business with the corporate community at large,
Foxwoods enjoys greater economic freedom to pursue its interests in the mar-
ketplace than if it were restricted to dealing in tribal assets alone.  Foxwoods
implicitly, if not explicitly, waived immunity to suit when it entered into a loan
agreement with its creditors.  It is incumbent on Foxwoods to take responsibil-
178 Kurak, supra note 40, at 389 (emphasis added).
179 340 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2003).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 767.
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ity for its actions as a corporate entity, discharge its duties at law and pay back
its creditors.
Being a commercial participant entails being commercially responsible.  It
means paying liabilities where and as they become due in accordance with the
agreement, the law and the principles of equity.  If a core purpose underlying
the doctrine of tribal immunity is to foster economic development and self-
sufficiency, courts should enforce the provisions of the Code and ensure that
creditors are paid first.  Such a decision would adhere to Congressional intent
to include tribes in the application of the Code, would send the signal that
investors can conduct business with Native tribes on a fair and profitable play-
ing field for all parties and, ultimately, would promote the economic self-suffi-
ciency which the doctrine of tribal immunity is supposed to support, but instead
impedes.
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